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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is basic to income taxation that each taxpayer should be taxed on 
his or her economic income and that only taxpayers who suffer economic 
losses should derive tax benefits therefrom. 1 While these tenets are easily 
stated, they are difficult to enforce, particularly in the partnership setting 
where lines between the economic interests of partners are often blurred. The 
substantial economic effect rules of section 704(b) strive mightily to constrain 
partners' ability to shift income and losses in a manner inconsistent with the 
partners' economic arrangement. Nevertheless, when a partner contributes 
property to a partnership, the possibility exists that some of the gain or loss 
inherent in that property may be shifted from the contributor to the other 
partners. No gain or loss is recognized at the time of the contribution, and the 
partnership, as new owner of the property, takes the contributor's basis. Thus, 
upon any subsequent sale of the property, the gain or loss, including gain or 
loss inherent in the property when contributed, is generally treated as that of 
the partnership entity and, absent a special rule, would be divided amongst 
the partners. 
This shifting of gain or loss was tolerated before 1984. Under section 
704(c), partners were permitted to agree that the subsequent gain or loss 
would be reported by the contributing partner, but this treatment was never 
mandatory. Moreover, the regulations under section 704(c) contained rules 
constraining that agreement, the most significant of which came to be known 
as the "ceiling rule," providing that the gain or loss allocated to the 
contributing partner could not exceed the partnership's entire gain or loss on 
the sale. When the ceiling rule applied, precontribution gain or loss was 
effectively shifted to the noncontributing partners in spite of the partners' 
agreement to the contrary. 
In 1984, Congress, concluding that the shifting of precontribution 
gain or loss to noncontributing partners should no longer be tolerated, made 
the prior permissive rule mandatory: Gain or loss inherent in contributed 
property must now be reported by the contributing partner. It gave the 
Treasury the task of drafting regulations to carry out this mandate. There is 
language in the legislative history to the 1984 Act implying that Congress 
intended the ceiling rule to continue after the 1984 legislation, despite the fact 
that its effect is inconsistent with the statutory mandate. In any event, the 
l. See, e.g. , Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 
(1930). There are exceptions to this rule. The most obvious is the rule of Crane v. 
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), which permits the holder of property subject to nonrecourse 
acquisition indebtedness to include the amount of that debt in basis. Crane often has the effect 
of permitting the ostensible owner of property to deduct losses that may ultimately be borne 
by the holder of the debt. 
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Treasury decided that it lacked authority to eliminate the ceiling rule and that 
while it could provide taxpayers with means to avoid or correct ceiling rule 
distortions, it could not compel them to do so. 
Final regulations under section 704( c) were issued a full 10 years 
after their legislative authorization. The regulations appear to create clear and 
concise rules for taxpayers to follow in planning contribution transactions. 
However, those rules are qualified by an anti-abuse rule which, if broadly 
construed, could largely obscure the clarity of the main rules. 
This article examines the section 704( c) regulations in detail, in an 
attempt to gauge the scope of the anti-abuse rule. Part II describes the history 
of section 704(c) and the regulations construing it. Part III evaluates the anti-
abuse rule in particular. It concludes that a narrow reading of the rule is 
appropriate and consistent with subchapter K as a whole. 
II. THE BASIC OPERATION OF SECTION 704(C) 
In explaining section 704(c), I rely on several simple examples and 
some variations. Example I and its variations illustrate the application of 
section 704(c) to nondepreciable property. Example II and its variations deal 
with depreciable property.2 
A. Contributions of Nondepreciable Property 
Example /. A and B form an equal partnership to which A contributes 
land with a basis of $60 and a fair market value of $ 100 and B 
contributes $100 of cash. The land was a capital asset in A's hands 
and is also a capital asset in the partnership's hands. 
While A has effectively realized $40 of gain (she received a 
partnership interest worth $100 in exchange for the land), this gain is not 
recognized (section 721(a)). The partnership is the owner of the land with a 
basis equal to A's basis of $60 (section 722). The partnership interest that A 
now holds is a capital asset in which she has a basis of $60 (section 723). 
The partnership capital accounting rules require the partnership to 
account for this transaction for book purposes by giving A credit in her 
capital account for the land's full fair market value,3 and the land should be 
reflected on the asset side of the partnership's balance sheet at that value.4 
2. For ease of reference, the facts of the examples are restated in the Appendix. 
3. Regs. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(b). 
4. Regs. § 1. 704-1 (b )(2)(iv )( d). Although partnerships are not required to follow the 
capital account maintenance rules unless they rely upon the safe harbor for substantial 
economic effect under § l.704-l(b)(2)(ii), the regulations governing contributed property 
require partnerships that do not do so to use book capital accounts "based upon the same 
principles." Regs. § I. 704-3(a)(3). 
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As a result, a disparity exists between the partnership's tax and book 
accounts; the land has a tax basis of $60 but a book value of $100. To reflect 
these disparities, and to assist in tracing them to the partner to whom they are 
attributable, the regulations contemplate maintenance of "tax capital" accounts 
for the partners,5 which essentially reflect each partner's share of the 
partnership's inside basis, net of liabilities. Thus, at formation, the partner-
























It is apparent from the balance sheet that if the partnership were to 
sell the land for $100, it would have a tax gain of $40, but no book gain. A's 
book capital account reflects that she was credited with book gain of $40 
when she contributed the property. Thus, if any of the $40 tax gain were 
reported by B, the result would be to tax B on book gain that was enjoyed by 
A. This shifting of gain was permitted by section 704(c)(l) before the 1984 
amendment. Under former section 704(c)(l), A and B were permitted to agree 
to treat the $40 tax gain in the same manner as partnership gains generally, 
5. The concept of tax capital accounts first appeared in the regulations under 
§ 704(b). These regulations deal with a problem related to § 704(c): the consequences of a 
revaluation of partnership property. Under§ l.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(f), partnerships are permitted to 
revalue their assets and restate their capital accounts to reflect current values upon the 
occurrence of several specified events, the most common of which are the admission of a new 
partner and the liquidation of a partner's interest. See Regs. § l.704-I(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5). When 
a partnership restates its capital accounts, the result is the creation of book/tax disparities like 
those that occur under § 704(c). The § 704(b) regulations, which were drafted after Congress 
enacted new § 704(c), but before regulations were issued under that provision, require that 
§ 704(c) principles be applied in allocating the tax items associated with the revalued property . 
See Regs. § I.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(f)(4). In examples of how that might be accomplished, the 
regulations introduce the concept of tax capital accounts. See, e.g. , Regs. § 1.704-1 (b)(5) exs. 
13, 14. The regulations under § 704(c) apply both to standard § 704(c) situations (the 
contribution of appreciated or depreciated property) and to "reverse § 704(c) allocations" 
(those resulting from revaluations of partnership property under Regs. § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(f)). 
Regs. § l.704-3(a)(6). 
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i.e., in the same proportions as they share book gains. Alternatively, section 
704(c)(2) allowed them to agree to allocate the gain to the contributing 
partner.6 
The regulations provided rules for allocating built-in gain or loss to 
the contributor if the partners so elected under old section 704(c)(2).7 Under 
those rules, which are continued in the new regulations as the "traditional 
method," the noncontributing partner is essentially treated as though she 
purchased an undivided interest in the property for its fair market value at the 
time of contribution, and allocations of tax items are made consistent with 
that treatment. As a result, where the contributed property is nondepreciable, 
only tax gains (or losses) corresponding to book gains (or losses) are 
allocated to noncontributing partners. In the example, if the partnership sells 
the property for $ 100, none of the $40 tax gain is allocated to B because she 
sustained no book gain. A, on the other hand, has a $40 disparity in her tax 
and book capital accounts, reflecting the fact that she was credited with a 
book gain at the time of contribution, which has not yet been matched by a 
tax gain. Therefore all of the corresponding $40 tax gain is allocated to her, 
fulfilling the basic mandate that tax must follow book, even though the tax 
allocation follows the book allocation on a delayed basis. This method 
dutifully accomplishes the goal of former section 704(c)(2) in many cases, as 
illustrated below: 
Example I, Variation I. The property in Example I increases in value 
and AB sells it for $120, resulting in a book gain of $20 and a tax 
gain of $60. 
Under their agreement, A and B share the book gain equally, $10 
apiece. Under the traditional method, the tax gain is allocated as follows: B, 
the noncontributing partner, is allocated tax gain equal to her book gain of 
$10, and A is allocated the balance, $50. By allocating tax gain first to the 
6. Before the 1984 amendments, § 704(c)(l) and (c)(2) read as follows: 
( 1) General Rule. In determining a partner's distributive share of items described in 
section 702(a), depreciation, depletion, or gain or loss with respect to property 
contributed to the partnership by a partner shall, except to the extent otherwise 
provided in paragraph (2) or (3), be allocated among the partners in the same 
manner as if such property had been purchased by the partnership. 
(2) Effect of partnership agreement. If the partnership agreement so provides, 
depreciation, depletion, or gain or loss with respect to property contributed to the 
partnership by a partner shall, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, be 
shared among the partners so as to take account of the variation between the basis 
of the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the time of contribu-
tion. 
7. Reg.§ l.704-l(c)(2) (before amendment in 1993). 
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noncontributing partner, the traditional method maintains equality between 
B's book and tax capital accounts. Once this is accomplished, the remaining 
tax gain is necessarily allocable to the contributing partner, A. In this 
variation, this allocation has the effect of eliminating entirely the tax/book 
disparity on the partnership's books. 
The prior regulations imposed one important limitation on the 
partners' ability to avoid shifts of gain: the so-called "ceiling rule."8 Under 
the ceiling rule, the amount that a partnership may allocate among its partners 
may not exceed the tax gain, income, loss, or deduction that the partnership, 
as an entity, recognizes for the year. In operation, the ceiling rule can cause 
serious distortions by shifting a portion of the built-in gain or loss to 
noncontributing partners.9 
Example I, Variation 2. The land in Example I goes down in value, 
and AB sells it for $70. 
In this sale, although AB has a book loss of $30, it has a tax gain of 
$10. A and B suffer book losses of $15 each; however, since the partnership 
entity has not sustained a tax loss to match its book loss, B cannot claim a 
tax loss, violating the principle that tax gains and losses should match book 
gains and losses and thereby creating a tax/book disparity in B's capital 
accounts. For tax purposes, the entire tax gain of $10 is allocated to A, but 
this amount is not sufficient to eliminate A' s tax/book disparity. Immediately 



















Although the tax/book disparity has been eliminated on the asset side 
of the balance sheet, a new one arises between B's tax and book accounts 
because B has sustained an economic loss that has been taken into account 
8. Id.; see Regs. § l.704-3(b)(l). 
9. See generally R. Donald Turlington, Section 704(c) and Partnership Book-Tax 
Disparities, The Ceiling Rule and the Art of Tax Avoidance, 46 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n § 26 
( 1988). 
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for book purposes but not for tax purposes: Her $15 economic loss has not 
been matched by a tax loss. On the other hand, A, who enjoyed a book gain 
of $40 when she contributed the property (and was given a book capital 
credit of $100) and sustained an offsetting loss of $15 when the property was 
sold (for a net gain of $25), has only reported $10 of tax gain, effectively 
(albeit temporarily) shifting $15 of that gain to B (via the deferred loss 
deduction). These effects, which are compelled by the ceiling rule, will 
presumably be offset one day when the partnership liquidates or when one or 
both of the partnership interests are sold. 10 In the meantime, B' s loss and 
A's gain are locked in. 
B. Contributions of Depreciable Property 
When the contributed property is depreciable, allocation of gain on 
sale, as in Example I, is not sufficient to accomplish the purpose of taxing the 
contributing partner on built-in gain because, if book depreciation is matched 
by real decline in value, there will be no gain on a sale made at the end the 
property's useful life. The only way to tax the contributor on built-in gain in 
depreciable property is to increase her share of presale income from the 
property. Under the traditional method, this is done by allocating depreciation 
away from the contributing partner: The noncontributing partner receives tax 
depreciation up to her share of book depreciation, and only if tax depreciation 
remains thereafter is it allocated to the contributing partner. The result is to 
tax the contributing partner on more than her book share of income from the 
property, thereby resolving the tax/book disparity over the property' s life. The 
opposite is done for built-in loss. 
Example II: C and D form an equal partnership to which C contrib-
utes equipment with a basis of $80 and a value of $120 and D 
contributes $120 cash. The equipment originally had a 10-year 
recovery period, and C elected to use the straight line method of cost 
recovery. Although only four years remain in its recovery period, if 
CD had purchased the equipment on the date of formation, it would 
have had a 10-year recovery period. C and D agree to share all book 
items equally. Upon formation, CD's balance sheet is as follows: 
I 0. If the partnership were immediately to liquidate, distributing cash of $85 to each 
partner, A would recognize gain of $15 under§ 73l(a)(l), and B would recognize a $15 loss 
under§ 73l(a)(2). Similarly, if either partnership interest were sold, the selling partner would 
recognize deferred gain or loss under § 741. 
JOO Florida Tax Review 
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CD must recover its transferred tax basis in the property over the 
property's remaining recovery period, using the same method as C, the 
straight line method. 11 Its book depreciation must be computed at the same 
rate as its tax depreciation. 12 Applying these rules to Example II: 
l. CD must recover its $80 tax basis using the straight line 
method over its remaining recovery period of four years ($20 
per year). 
2. CD therefore must also recover its $120 book basis using the 
straight line method over four years ($30 per year). 
Consistent with the general intent of the traditional method to treat 
noncontributing partners as if each purchased an undivided interest in 
contributed property for cash, the noncontributing partners are allocated (if 
possible) the same amount of cost recovery for tax purposes as they are for 
book purposes. If the partnership's cost recovery deduction exceeds the 
noncontributors' book share, the contributing partners are allocated the 
balance. On the facts of Example II, since each partner is entitled to $15 of 
depreciation for book purposes, the $20 of tax depreciation is allocated $15 
to D and $5 to C. Thus, although C and D have the same book income, C 
has $10 more taxable income than D. If we assume for the moment that book 
income is a surrogate for economic income, C is overtaxed by $ 10 each year. 
In this way, C is taxed on the built-in gain over the life of the property. After 
four years, C has taken into account all $40 of built-in gain, and the 
difference between the property's book value and tax basis has been entirely 
eliminated. 
11. IRC § 168(i)(7). 
12. Regs.§ l.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(g)(3). A partnership that does not maintain its capital 
accounts under the safe harbor rules of§ l.704-l(b)(2)(iv) must, for purposes of§ 704(c), use 
book capital accounts applying the same principles. Regs. § l.704-3(a)(3). However, it is not 
clear whether the book depreciation rules are among the principles that must be followed. For 
this reason, I assume that CD has chosen to follow the safe harbor rules. 
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When tax basis is less than the noncontributor' s share of book basis, 
the ceiling rule prevents the traditional method from completely eliminating 
the contributor's book/tax disparity, and shifts some of the built-in gain to the 
noncontributing partner. In those circumstances, there is insufficient tax 
depreciation to allocate to the noncontributing partner. 
Example II, Variation 1: C's adjusted basis for the equipment at the 
time of contribution, and hence CD' s initial adjusted basis, is $40. 
Thus, CD is permitted only $10 of annual depreciation for tax 
purposes. For each of its first four years, CD has $20 of ordinary 
business income before taking depreciation into account. 
Although D's share of the equipment's initial book value is $60, the 
total tax depreciation available under the ceiling rule is the $40 tax basis at 
the time of contribution. Thus, it will be impossible to treat D as though she 
purchased an undivided interest in the property. Although CD still has $30 
of annual book depreciation, $15 of which is allocable to D, CD only has $10 
of annual tax depreciation. Under the traditional method, all of this $10 is 
allocated to D. Nevertheless, since this allocation is insufficient to match D's 
share of book depreciation, it creates a disparity between D's tax and book 
capital accounts that will grow at the rate of $5 per year. After the first year, 
the partners' capital accounts are as follows: 
C D 
Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial Balance $120 $ 40 $120 $120 
Depreciation (15) (15) (10) 
Ordinary Income 10 10 10 10 
$115 $ 50 $115 $120 
The $5 disparity that has been created in D's capital accounts will 
grow to $20 after four years. In effect, the ceiling rule causes D to be 
overtaxed in the amount of $5 per year for four years, thereby taxing D on 
a portion of C's built-in gain. Resolution of these disparities is deferred until 
the liquidation of the partnership or a sale of the partnership interests. 
C. Whence the Ceiling Rule ? 
Before the enactment of subchapter K as part of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, there was significant confusion over the appropriate treatment 
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of contributed property. 13 The source of the confusion was the unresolved 
dichotomy between taxing partnerships as separate entities or as aggregates 
of their partners.14 Under a pure entity approach, built-in gain and loss from 
contributed property would be allocated consistently with all other gains and 
losses, making no attempt to trace precontribution gain or loss to the 
contributing partner. Under a pure aggregate approach, the noncontributing 
partner would be treated as though he had purchased an undivided interest in 
the property for cash, essentially giving the noncontributor a cost basis in the 
contributed property, even if the transferred basis from the contributing 
partner is less. Methods based on the aggregate approach were coined 
"deferred sale" or "credited value" approaches. The first was published in 
1932, in a general counsel memorandum proposing that the partners account 
for gain and loss from contributed property using a deferred sale approach, 
subject to the ceiling rule.15 Apparently because of the perceived difficulty 
of applying the aggregate approach to partnerships with multiple partners 
contributing multiple properties, the general counsel memorandum was 
subsequently revoked, and was reportedly not followed in the field during the 
period prior to its revocation. 16 
Congress' goal in the partnership provisions of the 1954 Code was 
to resolve the confusion of prior law, and in this context, it did so by 
enacting sections 704(c)(l) and (c)(2). The legislative history reflects 
Congress' awareness of the shifting potential of section 704( c )( l ). However, 
because the shifts would be resolved upon liquidation of the partnership or 
sale of a partner's interest, the problem was viewed one of "mere" deferral, 
prompting the simpler approach of section 704(c)(l). Section 704(c)(2) was 
viewed as an accommodation for taxpayers who wished to account more 
accurately for built-in gain or loss.17 
13. See generally S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. , 2d Sess. 89, 93-94 (1954), reprinted 
in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N 4621 , 4721, 4725-27. 
14. See Gregory Marich & William McKee, Sections 704(c) and 743(b): The 
Shortcomings of Existing Regulations and the Problems of Publicly Traded Partnerships, 41 
Tax L. Rev. 627, 635 ( 1986) ("The ceiling rule and its distortions are a product of the entity-
aggregate conflict that is deeply embedded within subchapter K"). 
15. G.C.M. 10092, XI-I Cum. Bull. 114 (1932), revoked by G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 
Cum. Bull. 58. In its recommendations to Congress in connection with the 1954 Code, the 
American Law Institute endorsed the entity approach, in spite of its attendant distortions, 
primarily because of its simplicity in contrast with the aggregate approach. The ALI did, 
however, advocate adoption of an elective aggregate approach. 2 American Law Institute 
Federal Income Tax Statute 355-56 (Feb. 1954 Draft). 
I 6. See Jackson, et al., A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment 
of Partnerships and Partners, 9 Tax L. Rev. 109, 123 (1954). 
17. This rule is admittedly more complicated than the entity rule, which 
is provided unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise. However, 
while the partnership remains in operation, this aggregate rule more 
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The legislative history of section 704(c)(2) is cited as the foundation 
for the ceiling rule. Although no express reference to the rule is made, 
support for it can be found in an example in which property with a basis of 
$40 and value of$ 100 is contributed to an equal two-person partnership. The 
Senate report notes that all $40 of depreciation should go to the noncontribu-
tor, and makes no reference to any deferred sale mechanism for increasing the 
depreciation to treat the noncontributor as though he had purchased an 
undivided interest. 18 The regulations under section 704(c)(2) imposed the 
ceiling limitation, and it has survived ever since. 
In sum, the law before 1984 was that income, gain, loss, and 
deduction from contributed property could be freely shifted among partners 
unless the partners elected otherwise, and even if they did elect otherwise, the 
ceiling rule in some cases made it impossible to completely eliminate shifting 
of income and loss. 
By 1984, Congress and the Treasury had become painfully aware of 
the time value of money, and the shifting permitted by section 704(c)(l) was 
no longer viewed as revenue neutral. The possibilities of abuse were readily 
apparent. Suppose that in Example I A is in the 40% tax bracket and B, 
because of an expiring capital loss carryforward, could report the built-in gain 
at no tax cost. 19 Unless A and B made an election under section 704(c)(2) 
(unlikely in these circumstances), some of the $40 gain would escape 
taxation. In 1984, Congress thus made mandatory the rule that the entire $40 
gain should be reported by A, the contributing partner. The statute now 
requires that 
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary ... income, 
gain, loss, and deduction with respect to property contributed 
to the partnership by a partner shall be shared among the 
partners so as to take account of the variation between the 
basis of the property to the partnership and its fair market 
value at the time of contribution . . . . 20 
equitably computes the taxable income of the partners. Since this is not a 
matter involving revenue considerations to the Government, and since 
partners are not compelled to use this rule, your committee believes that 
partners should be free to choose this more complicated rule for dividing 
basis of property if they desire the more accurate tax results it brings. 
S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. , 2d Sess. 4725 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 
4725. 
18. Id. 
19. B might also be a tax-exempt pension fund or a nonresident alien that is brought 
into the partnership specifically with a view to absorbing A's built-in gain. 
20. IRC § 704(c)(l). 
104 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 3:3 
D. What Remains of the Ceiling Rule? 
Although Congress made clear that it revised section 704( c) to 
preclude partners from shifting precontribution gain and loss among 
themselves, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history states 
whether Congress intended to abandon the ceiling rule. Because the ceiling 
rule results in just the type of distortions that the revised section 704( c) is 
intended to eliminate, arguably, the statute could be construed to eliminate the 
rule. 21 The more commonly held belief is that Congress intended that the 
ceiling rule continue, or at least that the Treasury should not impose 
aggregate treatment upon taxpayers. 22 The 1984 legislative history autho-
rized taxpayers to rely on the former regulations until new ones were issued, 
and while the grant of regulatory authority is broad, no suggestion is made 
that the Treasury should adopt some sort of deferred sale method.23 The 
presumption arising from the legislative history is that the traditional method 
would continue, although Treasury was authorized to provide various means 
of curing ceiling rule distortions. 
A decade passed before final regulations were issued under section 
704( c ), and during this time, there was much debate and speculation over 
what they would ultimately provide.24 Proposed regulations were issued in 
December of 199225 and were finalized on December 21, 1993.26 
21. See, e.g., Turlington, supra note 9, at 26-25. 
22. See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section Discusses Regulatory Issues 
Under Changes Made by '84 Act, 85 TNT 102-49 (May 22, 1985) (LEXIS, FEDTAX library, 
TNT file). See also Marich & McKee, supra note 14; John D. Steines, Jr., Partnership 
Allocations of Built-In Gain or Loss, 45 Tax L. Rev. 615-65 n.173 (1990) . 
23 . The House report accompanying the 1984 legislation states: 
It is anticipated that regulations under[§ 704(c)(l)] generally will provide 
for the same result that is achieved under present law when a partnership 
elects with respect to all relevant items to provide for sharing of deprecia-
tion, depletion, and gain or loss among the partners so as to take into 
account fully the variation between the basis of the property of the 
partnership and its fair market value at the time of the contribution. 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 1209 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 874, 876. In a footnote, the House report suggests that curative allocations of 
gain on a sale of depreciable property might be appropriate to resolve disparities created by 
ceiling limited depreciation. Id. n.3. This bolsters the argument that Congress intended the 
ceiling rule to remain in place. 
24. See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 22; Marich & McKee, supra 
note 14. 
25 . PS-164-84, 1993-1 C.B. 857. 
26. T.D. 8500, 1994-1 C.B. 183. The rules on the remedial allocation method were 
not finalized until December of 1994. T.D. 8585, 1995-1 C.B. 120. 
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E. The Regulations 
The regulations begin with the following statement: 
The purpose of section 704( c) is to prevent the shifting of tax 
consequences among partners with respect to precontribution gain or 
loss. Under section 704(c), a partnership must allocate income, gain, 
loss, and deduction with respect to property contributed by a partner 
to the partnership so as to take into account any variation between 
the adjusted tax basis of the property and its fair market value at the 
time of contribution.27 
This restatement of the statutory rule, preceded by a statement of the purpose 
of the statute, is followed by the edict that "the allocations must be made 
using a reasonable method that is consistent with the purpose of section 
704(c)."28 The balance of the regulations is devoted to fleshing out what the 
Treasury means by "reasonable." The regulations include an anti-abuse rule 
providing that an allocation is not reasonable if "the contribution of 
property ... and the corresponding allocation of tax items with respect to the 
property are made with a view to shifting the tax consequences of built-in 
gain or loss among the partners in a manner that substantially reduces the 
present value of the partners' aggregate tax liability."29 
The regulations describe three allocation "methods" that are 
"generally" considered reasonable, and state that "other methods may be 
reasonable in appropriate circumstances."30 The three methods are the 
traditional method, the traditional method with curative allocations, and the 
remedial allocation method. The traditional method is basically the same as 
the method of the old section 704(c)(2) regulations described above, ceiling 
rule and all. The traditional method with curative allocations provides a 
means of offsetting ceiling rule distortions in many cases, and the remedial 
allocation method allows ceiling rule distortions to be avoided altogether. 
It has been noted that although the final regulations speak of the three 
methods as separate and distinct, the traditional method is effectively the only 
"horse in the barn."31 The two other methods only modify that method as 
necessary to resolve distortions caused by the ceiling rule. The traditional 
method is a means of applying aggregate treatment to noncontributing 
27. Regs. § l.704-3(a)(l). 
28. Id. 
29. Regs. § l.704-3(a)(l0). 
30. Regs. § l.704-3(a)(l). 
31 . Barksdale Hortenstin & Gregory J. Marich, An Analysis of the Rules Governing 
Partnership Allocations with Respect to Contributed Properties: The Final Regulations Under 
Section 704(c), at 12 (1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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partners by maintammg an identity in each such partner' s book and tax 
capital accounts, and this goal of book/tax equality is at the heart of each of 
the three methods in the regulations. For example, if a partnership elects the 
curative allocation method, but never encounters a ceiling rule limitation, its 
allocations will be precisely the same as if it had elected the traditional 
method. Nevertheless, because the regulations describe the three methods as 
alternatives, I describe them separately. Yet, it is useful to keep in mind that 
at the heart of each is the mandate that tax allocations should follow book 
allocations, and that tax/book disparities should be avoided whenever possible 
and resolved as quickly as possible when they do arise. 
F. Traditional Method with Curative Allocations 
Partnerships using the traditional method with curative allocations 
may elect to make reasonable curative allocations to eliminate ceiling rule 
distortions.32 A "curative allocation" is a tax allocation of an item that 
differs from the allocation of the corresponding book item. The allocation is 
meant to "cure" disparities caused by the ceiling rule and is available only if 
the ceiling rule has created a book/tax disparity. Curative allocations must be 
reasonable in amount and of the same type as the item that was subject to the 
ceiling rule.33 Absent an appropriate item to allocate, a curative allocation 
cannot be made. To illustrate how the rules work for nondepreciable property, 
consider the following: 
Example I, Variation 3. Assume the facts of Example I, but further 
assume that AB invests its $100 of cash in stock that appreciates in 
value to $150 and that the land declines in value to $70. AB sells the 
land for $70 (recognizing $30 of book loss and $10 of tax gain) and 
sells the stock for $150 (recognizing a $50 gain for both book and 
tax purposes). 
After these sales, the capital accounts would, in the absence of curative 
allocations, be as follows: 
A B 
Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial Balance $100 $60 $100 $100 
Land Sale (15) 10 (15) 
Stock Sale ~ 25 ~ 25 
$110 $95 $110 $125 
32. Regs. § l.704-3(c). 
33. Regs. § l.704-3(c)(3). In the case of depreciable property, the period of time 
over which the curative allocations are made must also be reasonable. 
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The ceiling rule has created a book/tax disparity for both partners of $15. 
The gain on the stock sale, however, presents a possibility of 
eliminating the disparity by reallocating gain on the stock for tax purposes in 
the proportions $40 to A and $10 to B. The regulations permit this, so long 
as the reallocated amount does not exceed the amount of the ceiling limited 
item for the taxable year and is of the same type or character as that item. 
Since the amount of the curative allocation equals the amount of the 
distortion, and since the land and the stock are both capital assets, the 
curative allocation of the gain on the stock has the same effect as the loss 
limited by the ceiling rule. The allocation is therefore reasonable and results 
in the following adjustments to the partners' capital accounts: 
A B 
Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial Balance $100 $ 60 $100 $100 
Land Sale (15) 10 (15) 
Stock Sale 25 40 25 _!.Q 
$110 $110 $110 $110 
As applied to depreciable property, reconsider variation l of Example 
II, which is restated here for convenience: 
Example II, Variation I : Assume the facts of Example II, except that 
C's adjusted basis in the equipment at the time of contribution is $40. 
Thus, CD's initial adjusted basis in the equipment is also $40, and 
CD is permitted only $10 of annual depreciation for tax purposes. In 
addition, for each of the first four years, CD has $20 of ordinary 
business income before taking depreciation into account. 
If CD elects to use the traditional method with curative allocations, 
it can eliminate the annual distortion caused by the ceiling rule by making 
curative allocations of its ordinary income. CD has $20 of ordinary income 
that the partners share equally-$10 each. By allocating $15 of this income 
for tax (but not book) purposes to C and $5 to D, the ceiling rule distortion 
is "cured." Since this allocation is reasonable in both amount and type, it 
would be respected. If it is done, the partners' capital accounts are adjusted 
as follows: 
C D 
Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial Balance $120 $ 40 $120 $120 
Depreciation (15) (15) (10) 
Ordinary Income ____lQ _li _!.Q __ 5 
$115 $ 55 $115 $115 
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The purpose of curative allocations is easily seen in the context of 
depreciable property. Under the traditional method, the built-in gain in the 
property is amortized over the life of the property, as it produces income. 
When the ceiling rule applies, the noncontributor, in the absence of curative 
allocations, reports more than his or her economic share of the property' s 
income. The curative allocation of additional income to the contributing 
partner eliminates this distortion. 34 
G. Remedial Allocation Method 
The second mechanism for curing ceiling rule distortions is the 
"remedial allocation method."35 In essence, this method permits partners to 
ignore the ceiling rule, ensuring that tax allocations to the noncontributors are 
always available to match the book allocations to them. As applied to 
depreciable property, the method recalculates book depreciation in such a way 
that the noncontributors are treated, to some extent, as though they purchased 
undivided interests in the contributed property. The partners are authorized 
to create offsetting tax allocations to match the book allocations, with the 
result that the net amount allocated equals the partnership's total gain, loss, 
or deduction. Remedial allocations are fictitious, or notional, offsetting tax 
allocations; their only role is to eliminate disparities between book and tax 
accounts arising from the ceiling rule. They always equal the disparity and 
are of a character identical to that of the item limited by the ceiling rule. 
Because they are notional and offsetting, they have no effect on the 
partnership's taxable income or adjusted bases.36 The partners, however, 
must treat remedial allocations as actual tax items, and the allocations may 
therefore affect both tax liability and outside bases.37 
As discussed below, the remedial allocation method treats a 
contribution of property to a partnership in some ways as if it were a sale, 
with the gain on that sale recognized by the contributing partner only as 
necessary to neutralize application of the ceiling rule. It is a simplified 
descendant of the deferred sale method proposed by the ALI in 1954. It is the 
only pure aggregate approach authorized by the regulations. 
To illustrate how this method applies to nondepreciable property, 
reconsider variation 1 of Example I, where the land falls in value and the AB 
partnership sells it for $70, resulting in $30 of book loss and $10 of tax gain. 
The book loss is allocated equally between A and B-$15 each. If the part-
nership uses the traditional method, the ceiling rule prevents B from receiving 
a tax loss to match her book loss because there is no tax loss. If, however, 
34. See Marich & McKee, supra note 14, at 645. 
35. Regs. § l.704-3(d). 
36. Regs. § l.704-3(d)(4)(i). 
37. Regs. § l.704-3(d)(4)(ii). 
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the partnership elects the remedial allocation method, B is allocated tax loss 
of $15, characterized as if it were from the sale of the land, and A is allo-
cated an offsetting tax gain of $15 of the same character. A thus reports gain 
of $25 (sum of $10 of partnership gain on the sale and $15 of remedial allo-
cation), and B reports loss of $15, netting out to the partnership's gain of $10 
and producing the appropriate result described above that was prohibited by 
the ceiling rule. Under the remedial method, the partners' capital accounts are 
adjusted as follows : 
A B 
Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial Balance $100 $60 $100 $100 
Land Sale (15) 10 (15) 
Remedial Allocation 0 ~ _o __{__ill 
$ 85 $85 $ 85 $ 85 
In contrast with the traditional method with curative allocations, these 
remedial allocations are not dependent on the partnership having other items 
of income or loss. If AB had used the traditional method with curative 
allocations, the lack of other capital gains would have blocked the elimination 
of the disparity created by the ceiling rule. 
A partnership adopting the remedial allocation method for depreciable 
property must use a special rule for computing book items (including 
depreciation) with respect to the property. This rule is loosely based on the 
notion that the contributing partner sold the property on a deferred basis to 
the partnership on the date of contribution for its fair market value. To the 
extent of its transferred basis, the partnership steps into the shoes of the 
contributing partner for both book and tax purposes and must continue to use 
the contributing partner's cost recovery method. If the property's value 
exceeds its basis, the excess is treated for book purposes as if the partnership 
had purchased the property for this amount, and book depreciation is 
calculated on this amount using any method of cost recovery that is allowed 
for property of that type. 38 
The partnership then uses the traditional method to allocate the 
related tax items, with tax allocations to noncontributing partners following 
book allocations to the extent possible. If the ceiling rule prevents noncontrib-
uting partners from receiving tax allocations equal to the corresponding book 
allocations, the partnership makes offsetting remedial allocations of the appro-
priate character and amount to both contributing and noncontributing partners. 
38. The partnership must also use the appropriate first year convention. See IRC 
§ 168(d) (allowing half-year, mid-month, and mid-quarter conventions); Regs.§ l.704-3(d)(2) 
(also allowing first-year convention). 
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To illustrate, assume the partnership in variation of Example II 
adopts the remedial allocation method. For book purposes, the partnership is 
treated as if it acquired two pieces of equipment, one contributed by C with 
a value and a basis of $40, and one that it purchases for $80 (the excess of 
the property' s value ($120) over its basis ($40)). With respect to the 
contributed portion, the partnership steps into C's shoes, recovering the $40 
of basis for both book and tax purposes using the straight line method over 
the remaining four years of the property' s life-depreciation of $10 per year 
for both tax and book purposes. With respect to the notionally purchased 
portion, the partnership may adopt any appropriate method of cost recovery. 
Ignoring conventions, if CD chooses the straight line method over 10 years, 
the purchased portion provides CD with $8 of book (but not tax) depreciation 
each year for 10 years. Therefore, CD has a book cost recovery deduction of 
$18 per year ($10 from the contributed portion and $8 from the purchased 
portion) for the first four years and $8 per year for the remaining six years. 
























For each of its first four years of operation, CD has $2 of income for book 











For book purposes, C and D are each entitled to one half of both the ordinary 
income ($10) and the depreciation ($9), a net of $1 each per year. For tax 
purposes, each is allocated $10 of ordinary income. However, under the 
traditional method, D is allocated $9 of depreciation, and C only $1. 
Therefore, D has $1 of taxable income, and C $9: 
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C D 
Book Tax Book Tax 
Ordinary Income $10 $10 $10 $10 
Depreciation __m __{_il __m _m 
$ 1 $ 9 $ 1 $ 1 
At the end of the first four years, the capital accounts of the partnership are 
as follows: 
C D 
Book Tax Book Tax 
Initial Balance $120 $ 40 $120 $120 
Aggregate Adjustments 4 __]§ 4 4 
$124 $ 76 $124 $124 
During this period, the book/tax disparity in C's capital account 
declines from $80 to $48 because C takes only $1 a year in depreciation, 
while her book depreciation is $9. In effect, Cover reports taxable income 
by $8 annually, thereby taking into account $32 of the $80 of built-in gain 
that was inherent in the property when it was contributed. To this point, the 
ceiling rule has not applied, and the partnership has not used remedial 
allocations. 
The analysis changes thereafter. During years 5 through 10, the 
partnership continues to have $20 of ordinary income, but its book deprecia-
tion is only $8. The partnership' s net annual book income is $12, and each 
partner' s share is $6. For tax purposes, the partnership is no longer entitled 
to any depreciation. Although D is charged $4 of depreciation for book 
purposes, the ceiling rule prohibits any allocation of depreciation for tax 
purposes. Therefore, under the remedial allocation method, the partnership 
must make two offsetting remedial allocations of $4 each year. Each year, the 
partners ' capital accounts have the following adjustments: 
C D 
Book Tax Book Tax 
Ordinary Income $10 $10 $10 $10 
Depreciation (4) 0 (4) 0 
Remedial Allocation 4 _ill 
Annual Net Adjustment $ 6 $14 $ 6 $ 6 
Each year, C reports $8 more taxable income than she has for book purposes. 
This reduces the disparity between tax and book so that by the end of year 
10, the disparity will have disappeared. 
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H. Anti-abuse Rules 
As noted above, the Treasury's blessing of the three alternative 
methods for making section 704(c) allocations is subject to a general anti-
abuse rule, providing that an allocation method is not reasonable if 
the contribution of property ... and the corresponding 
allocation of tax items with respect to the property are made 
with a view to shifting the tax consequences of built-in gain 
or loss among the partners in a manner that substantially 
reduces the present value of the partners' aggregate tax 
liability. 39 
The regulations provide some guidance in interpreting this apparently 
very broad rule in two examples-one involving the traditional method 
(example 2) and the other the traditional method with curative allocations 
(example 3).40 In both examples, an equal partnership is formed with one 
partner contributing property with a value of $10,000 and an adjusted basis 
of $1,000 and the other partner contributing $10,000 cash. The property has 
only one year left in its recovery period, but has a substantially longer 
economic life, which for purposes of this analysis I assume to be IO years.41 
As is developed in more detail below, central to the potential for abuse in 
both examples is the fact that the property's recovery period for tax purposes 
is significantly shorter than its useful life. 
Example 2 illustrates unreasonable use of the traditional method. In 
this example, the property contributor ( C) is in a high marginal bracket, and 
the cash contributor (D) is in the zero bracket because of a net operating loss 
deduction that will soon expire. The contribution of property is made "with 
a view to taking advantage of the fact that the equipment has only one year 
remaining on its cost recovery schedule although its remaining economic life 
is significantly longer."42 Under the traditional method, the partnership takes 
$10,000 of depreciation for book purposes and $1,000 of depreciation for tax 
purposes in the first year, reducing the partnership's basis in the property to 
zero for both book and tax purposes and eliminating all of the section 704(c) 
gain. The partners share the book depreciation equally, while D is allocated 
all of the tax depreciation. The effect of the ceiling rule is to restrict D's 
allocation of tax depreciation to $1,000, $4,000 less than his share of book 
depreciation. 
39. Regs. § l.704-3(a)(I0). 
40. Regs. § l.704-3(b)(2) ex. 2, (c)(4) ex. 3. 
41. In example 2, it is stated that the property ' s useful life is "significantly longer" 
than its recovery period, and in example 3, the property has a JO-year economic life. 
42. Regs. § l.704-3(b) ex. 2(i). 
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If one views book income and deductions as reflecting economic 
income and loss, the noncontributing partner is overtaxed by $4,000, all in 
the first year. This view, however, does not reflect the true economics of the 
transaction. Ideally, D should be treated for tax purposes as though she had 
purchased for $5,000 an interest in property having a 10-year useful life. 
Using straight line depreciation, D should be allocated $500 of depreciation 
annually for 10 years. D is actually undertaxed in the first year because she 
receives $1,000 of depreciation instead of $500. In the absence of a sale, 
however, she will be overtaxed by $500 for each of the next nine years 
because there is no tax depreciation. The result at the end of the property's 
life is that D has been overtaxed by $4,000. Therefore, the effect of the 
ceiling rule in the first year is to lock in the amount of income ($4,000) that 
will eventually be shifted to D, although the actual shift occurs throughout 
the property's life. 
To this point, the ceiling rule distortion is garden-variety: The 
partnership has insufficient tax depreciation to match the noncontributor's 
book depreciation. The distinguishing feature of this example, which is 
apparently what rendered it abusive in the Treasury's eyes, is that even 
though the property has been depreciated down to a book value of zero, its 
value at the beginning of year two is $10,000, which the partnership realizes 
both for book and tax purposes through sale. Under the partnership agree-
ment, the resulting gain of $10,000 is shared equally for both book and tax 
purposes. If these allocations were respected, the capital accounts would be 
adjusted as follows: 
C D 
Tax Book Tax Book 
Initial Balance $1,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
Depreciation 0 (5,000) (1,000) (5,000) 
Sale 52000 52000 52000 52000 
$6,000 $10,000 $14,000 $10,000 
The interplay of the one-year cost recovery period, the sale, and the 
traditional method results in a shift for tax purposes of $4,000 of gain from 
C to D, all occurring in year two. While this shift became inevitable in year 
one, when the ceiling rule restricts D's depreciation deduction, the shift is 
actually realized for tax purposes when the property is sold in year two. In 
that year, D reports $4,000 of gain for tax purposes that should have been 
reported by C. The regulations note that if the partnership agreement had 
called for a curative allocation of an additional $4,000 of gain to C, the anti-
abuse rule would not apply.43 
43. Regs. § l.704-3(b)(2) ex. 2(ii)(C). 
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The second example of the anti-abuse rule (example 3) involves 
unreasonable use of the traditional method with curative allocations.44 The 
facts of this example are similar to the first, but there are important 
differences: The bracket positions of the partners are reversed-the property 
contributor (J) is the zero bracket taxpayer due to a net operating loss 
deduction, and the cash contributor (K) is in a high bracket; the partnership 
does not intend to sell the property; and the partnership generates $8,000 of 
sales income in its first year of operations. Under the traditional method with 
curative allocations, the partnership' s $10,000 of book depreciation is shared 
equally, and the $1,000 of tax depreciation is allocated entirely to K. The 
partners make a curative allocation of sales income to J to make up for the 
ceiling rule limitation on K's depreciation deduction: For book purposes, each 
partner receives $4,000 of sales income, but for tax purposes, all $8,000 is 
allocated to J.45 If this were respected, the partners' capital accounts would 
be adjusted as follows: 
J K 
Tax Book Tax Book 
Initial Balance $1,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
Depreciation 0 (5,000) (1,000) (5,000) 
Sales Income 8,000 4,000 0 4,000 
$9,000 $ 9,000 $ 9,000 $9,000 
The curative allocation eliminates the disparity between the tax and book 
capital accounts, thereby curing the ceiling rule distortion entirely in the first 
year. Had no curative allocation been made, the partners would have divided 
the sales income equally over the life of the equipment, and the book/tax 
disparity created in the first year would have continued indefinitely. 
Nevertheless, the regulations find this to be an unreasonable use of 
the traditional method with curative allocations. K is undertaxed by $4,500 
for year one,46 but would, in the absence of the curative allocation, be 
overtaxed by $500 in each of the nine succeeding years. The overtaxation is 
fully offset by the curative allocation made for year one. Instead of 
depreciating its investment in the property over the IO-year life at the rate of 
$500 per year, the curative allocation effectively allows K to deduct its entire 
$5,000 investment in the first year. Therein lies the abuse: K, the high bracket 
44. Regs. § l.704-3(c)(4) ex. 3. 
45. See Regs.§ l.704-3(c)(4) ex. 3(i). When the regulations were proposed in 1992, 
the curative allocation of sales income was only $750. Prop. Regs. § l.704-3(c)(4) ex . 2(i). 
This was changed in the final regulations to make the shift more dramatic. 
46. K's economic income is $4,500 ($4,000 of sales income, less $500 of economic 
depreciation), but its taxable income is zero. 
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taxpayer, is essentially allowed to immediately deduct its entire cost of its 
share of the equipment at no tax cost to either J or the partnership. The built-
in gain for which J should ultimately be responsible is accelerated, but since 
J is currently in the zero bracket, he owes no additional tax. According to the 
regulations, the curative allocations would be reasonable if they were made 
over the property's economic life.47 
ill. EVALUATION OF ANTI-ABUSE RULE 
A. Generally 
The anti-abuse rule has been described by commentators as the 
"heart" of the section 704( c) regulations48 and as a "potent weapon" in the 
hands of the Service.49 These characterizations reflect a concern that the 
anti-abuse rule is so broad that it could potentially apply to any contribution 
transaction if the ceiling rule works to the advantage of the partners by 
reducing their overall tax liability. The regulations contain a statement 
belying this notion: "An allocation method is not necessarily unreasonable 
merely because another allocation method would result in a higher aggregate 
tax liability."50 However, the Treasury refused to establish safe harbors from 
the anti-abuse rule, leaving open the possibility that the rule might apply even 
to the remedial allocation method in certain circumstances.51 
I do not agree that the anti-abuse rule will be applied in such a broad 
fashion, nor do I believe that it should be so applied. While the regulations 
contain no explicit safe harbors (save the virtually useless one assuring that 
the traditional method is reasonable if the ceiling rule never applies), I believe 
that the traditional method is reasonable, and ceiling rule shifts will be 
tolerated, unless the partners plan the transaction to manipulate the timing of 
the ceiling rule shifts, or the correction of those shifts through curative 
allocations, so as to have them occur at minimal tax cost. Stated another way, 
the anti-abuse rule should apply to the traditional method only if the partners 
accelerate the ceiling rule shift in such a way as to substantially reduce the 
present value of their tax liability below that which it would have been had 
the ceiling rule shift occurred over the economic life of the contributed 
47. Regs. § l.704-3(c)(4) ex. 3 (ii)(C). 
48. William S. McKee et al. , Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners 
'I 10.04[3][a] (2d ed. Supp. 1995). 
49. Gregory J. Marich et al., The Remedial Allocation Method: A Viable Cure for 
the Ceiling Rule, 65 Tax Notes 1267, 1270 (Dec. 5, 1994). 
50. Regs. § l.704-3(a)(l). 
51. See T.D. 8500, supra note 26, at 184 ("The IRS and Treasury believe it is 
appropriate to require that all allocation methods satisfy the anti-abuse rule"). 
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property. In the context of the traditional method with curative allocations, 
the reach of the anti-abuse rule should be limited to curative allocations that 
are made at no significant tax cost over a period substantially shorter than the 
contributed property's economic life. 
In the regulations, the Treasury accepted the traditional method's 
approach of maintaining tax/book disparities as the basic means of applying 
section 704(c) in all cases, authorizing variations only as necessary to avoid 
ceiling rule distortions. It apparently believes that it lacks authority to 
eliminate the ceiling rule. Whether or not this assumption is justified, if the 
ceiling rule is viewed as inviolate, use of the traditional method in most cases 
must be respected. The basic rule of the traditional method-that tax 
allocations should follow book allocations to the extent possible--often 
results in ceiling rule shifts of income, but it should be considered abusive 
only rarely. Those rare cases can be identified in advance: Tax allocations 
following book allocations are potentially abusive when the latter deviate 
significantly from economic reality because in those cases the_ timing of the 
ceiling rule shift can be manipulated. 
The Treasury's illustrations of the anti-abuse rule support the 
conclusion that the traditional method is reasonable in all but the most 
unusual circumstances. In the examples, the anti-abuse rule is applied not to 
override shifts occasioned by the ceiling rule, but to control the timing of the 
making and correcting of the shifts. The examples illustrate that an anti-abuse 
rule is needed for two reasons: a ceiling rule that the Treasury believed it 
could not eliminate, and uneconomic cost recovery rules that it cannot fix. As 
a consequence, the Treasury chose to circle the wagons and issue in terrorem 
regulations whose bark is far worse than their bite. 
B. Survival of the Ceiling Rule 
Arguments have been made for and against retention of the ceiling 
rule, but the Treasury apparently decided that it lacked authority to repeal it. 
There is substantial evidence of this, both from informal statements from 
Treasury personnel and in the regulations. When commentators expressed 
concern about the Treasury's authority to override the ceiling rule through the 
remedial allocation method, the Treasury stated that the rule would be 
elective only, and the regulations state that neither that nor any other method 
based upon notional tax allocations may be imposed upon taxpayers.52 The 
52. In exercising its authority under paragraph (a)(lO) of this section to 
make adjustments if a partnership's allocation method is not reasonable, 
the Internal Revenue Service will not require a partnership to use the 
remedial allocation method described in this paragraph (d) or any other 
method involving the creation of notional tax items. 
Regs. § l.704-3(d)(5)(ii). 
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Treasury further stated that because of the elective nature of the remedial 
allocation method, it cannot be viewed as the baseline for measuring 
abuse.53 
Once the ceiling rule is considered inviolate, except at the election of 
the taxpayer, one might ask why the traditional method, which relies on 
Treasury's basic principle of tax following book, can ever be considered 
abusive. Only in ceiling-limited situations does the method fail to accomplish 
the stated purpose of section 704(c), and the Treasury has accepted the ceiling 
rule as something it must live with. The answer lies in example 2 of the 
regulations. 
C. Interpreting the Examples of Abuse 
The Treasury's only guidance on the scope of the anti-abuse rule is 
that provided by the examples in the regulations. By varying the facts of 
example 2, it becomes apparent that the scope of the anti-abuse rule in the 
context of the traditional method is necessarily quite limited. In that example, 
the partnership sells the contributed property at the beginning of the second 
year, after its tax basis and book value have been reduced to zero by 
depreciation for the first year. Assume that rather than selling the property, 
the CD partnership uses it for its entire useful life, at which point its value 
is zero. 
Under the traditional method, the ceiling rule limits the allocations for 
year one, creating a tax/book disparity, because there is insufficient tax 
depreciation to match the noncontributor's (D's) book depreciation. As the 
property produces income over its useful life, D will include one half of the 
income from the property without any offsetting deduction for D's investment 
in the property. The effect of the ceiling rule, therefore, is to deny to D cost 
recovery deductions for $4,000 of its investment in the property, thereby 
shifting $4,000 of the built-in gain from C to D. Unlike the example in the 
regulations, however, the shift of income to D occurs over the life of the 
property, not entirely in the year immediately following the contribution. 
Does this variation on the facts invoke the anti-abuse rule? Contrary to the 
view of some commentators,54 I do not believe it should. 
53. In response to a comment suggesting that the remedial allocation method be 
used as a baseline, the preamble to the 1994 regulations states: "[T]he IRS and Treasury 
believe that it would be inappropriate to adopt the remedial allocation method as a baseline 
for measuring whether the partners' aggregate tax liability has been reduced. Such a baseline 
would make the remedial allocation method preeminent, undercutting its elective nature." T.D. 
8585, supra note 26, at 121. 
54. See McKee et al., supra note 49, 'f 10.04[3][b], at 510-55 (Supp. 1995). 
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The anti-abuse applies only if tax items are allocated "with a view" 
to reducing the present value of the partners' taxes by shifting built-in gain 
or loss.55 In example 2, the proscribed "view" is described as an intention 
to take advantage of the disparity between the property's remaining recovery 
period and its economic life. The advantage derived from the disparity is not 
the fact of the ceiling rule shift of income, but the timing of the shift. And, 
it is not the ceiling rule that provides the abusive result, but the capital 
accounting rules dealing with cost recovery, for it is those rules that define 
the extent of the tax/book disparity. 
Disregarding the plan to sell the property at the beginning of year 
two, the example merely illustrates a garden-variety ceiling rule shift; absent 
an acceleration of that shift through sale, the partners have not taken 
advantage of the difference between the cost recovery period and the useful 
life of the property. The planned sale does not cause the ceiling rule shift; it 
merely accelerates the shift. Had the Treasury viewed the shift alone as 
abusive, the sale would serve no purpose to the example. The effect of 
including the sale in the facts of the example is, therefore, to limit the scope 
of the anti-abuse rule to those situations where ceiling rule shifts are 
accelerated and not allowed to occur over the life of the property. 
Had the Treasury wished to extend the reach of the anti-abuse rule 
to all ceiling rule shifts of income to lower bracket taxpayers, example 2 
could have been significantly simpler. True, even if the property is not sold, 
the shift reduces the present value of the partners' aggregate tax liability 
below that which it would have been had there been no ceiling limitation 
(i.e., had they used the remedial allocation method). But, to find that abusive 
is anomalous. How can taxpayers be penalized for not electing a method that 
Treasury has stated it lacks the power to impose? To find abuse in this case 
would be nothing more than a back door repeal of the ceiling rule. 
Thus, the distinguishing feature of example 2 appears to be not the 
fact of a shift of income, but the timing of the shift. Apparently, the 
prohibited abuse occurs where the parties arrange the transaction with a plan 
to accelerate the shift of income. In this example, the event accelerating the 
shift is the sale, and the partners could have avoided the anti-abuse rule by 
allocating the gain on sale to the contributing partner.56 In addition, the 
55. Reg. § l.704-3(a)(l0). 
56. Just when the sale must occur to fall within the anti-abuse rule is unclear. For 
example, should the anti-abuse rule apply if the partnership sells the land in year three, rather 
than year two? The answer turns on whether the reduction in tax is "substantial" and whether 
the requisite "view" exists (i.e., whether the sale in year was three planned and sufficiently 
definite). If the useful life of the property is 10 years, a sale in year three might well result 
in a substantial reduction in the present value of aggregate tax liabilities, compared to that 
which would have been incurred had the property been held to the end of its useful life. If the 
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regulations require that the allocations be made "with a view" to taking 
advantage of the disparity between recovery period and useful life. It thus 
appears that the scope of the anti-abuse rule is quite limited. Unless the 
parties planned the sale at the time of the contribution, and unless the sale 
actually occurs substantially before the end of the property's useful life, use 
of the traditional method should be considered reasonable.57 
Analysis of example 3, illustrating unreasonable use of the traditional 
method with curative allocations, adds further support to the conclusion that 
the abuse potential is not in creating shifts of income, but in manipulating the 
timing of those shifts. As discussed above, in example 3, the curative 
allocation of $4,000 of sales income to the contributing partner in the first 
year eliminates the shift of income, but also has the effect of permitting the 
noncontributor to expense her investment in the contributed property in the 
first year. This is caused by the requirement that the full cost of the property 
be recovered for book purposes over the remainder of the contributor's 
recovery period (in this case, consisting of year one only), a rule that ignores 
the economic reality that the property has a significant remaining useful life. 
The regulations note that had the partnership agreement provided for curative 
allocations over the property's economic life, the allocations would have been 
reasonable. Thus, had the allocations of sales income to J been made at the 
rate of $400 per year, rather than $4,000 in the first year, they would have 
property's useful life is three years, the sale in year three likely does not significantly reduce 
tax liabilities, and the rule should not apply. See Regs. § I.704-3(b)(2) ex. 2(ii). 
57. Example 2 could be seen as an application of the broader anti-abuse rule of 
§ 1.701-2, which qualifies all of subchapter K. The interaction of C's view, C's and D's 
bracket position, and the quick sale suggest that C's contribution of low-basis, high-value 
equipment is driven not by the need of the partnership for this particular equipment for the 
conduct of its operations but by the favorable tax consequences that flow from the interaction. 
In this sense, contribution of the equipment (rather than cash or other liquid assets available 
to C): 
I . might be regarded as inconsistent with the overall purpose of subchapter 
K (in the words of§ l.701-2(a), to "conduct joint business ... activities 
through a flexible economic arrangement") because use of the equipment 
in the partnership's business (as opposed to its sale) was not contemplated; 
2. might contravene§ l.701-2(a)(l) as not made for "a substantial business 
purpose" (as distinguished from the general need of the partnership for 
working capital which could as well be provided by money or other 
property contributed by C); and 
3. might violate the clear reflection of income requirement of§ 1.701-2(a)(3). 
Applying the omnibus anti-abuse rule in this setting requires considerable speculation 
and second-guessing. Presumably, as a general matter, it is not up to the government to decide 
for the partners' just what ingredients each brings to their combination to yield the greatest 
chance of success. In the § 704(c) context, the inquiry is more focused and requires less 
speculation. See Regs. § I.704-2(a). 
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been respected. This makes sense because, except for the first year' s 
deduction of $1,000, K would, under that scenario, write off the cost of the 
equipment over its economic life. 
Both the traditional method and the traditional method with curative 
allocations are based on the notion that tax allocations must follow book 
allocations, thereby taxing the noncontributor as though he had purchased an 
undivided interest in the property. Where book allocations approximate 
economic income, this basic method taxes the partners economically, and 
cannot be abusive. The problems arise when book allocations bear little, if 
any, relationship to economic income, as is the case in both of the abuse 
examples. In the case of the traditional method, abuse arises only if the 
ceiling rule shifts are manipulated so as to occur over a period of time shorter 
than the property's economic life. In the case of the traditional method with 
curative allocations, abuse may exist if the curative allocations are made over 
a period substantially shorter than the economic life of the property. Because 
the remedial allocation method requires that the remedial allocations be made 
over the recovery period for the property, it is not susceptible to abuse.58 
D. The Key: Uneconomic Rules of Cost Recovery 
The foregoing analysis of the anti-abuse rule indicates that it is 
intended to deal with problems of timing, not shifts of income per se. It is 
thus possible to limit the rule to situations where book allocations deviate 
significantly from economic reality. In both of the examples illustrating the 
rule, the most significant factors are the disparity between cost recovery 
period and useful life and the elimination of all built-in gain in one year.59 
58. Although the recovery periods of § 168 do not, nor were they intended to, 
reflect economic lives, the book recovery period dictated by the remedial allocation method 
for any excess of the contributed property's value over its basis-the recovery period under 
§ 168 for newly purchased property-is far more likely to approximate economic life than is 
the remaining tax recovery period. McKee, Nelson, and Whitmire have suggested that the 
remedial allocation method may be abusive when depreciation on contributed property would 
not be ceiling limited, so that the contributor's depreciation under the remedial allocation 
method is greater than it would be under the traditional method. See McKee et al., supra note 
49, <JI I0.04[3][d] at l0-60. In the example they offer, the contributor' s extra tax depreciation 
during the property's remaining recovery period is offset by later remedial allocations, a result 
which the authors suggest might be abusive if the contributor is taxable and the noncontributor 
is not. I disagree that use of the remedial allocation method falls under the anti-abuse rule in 
such a situation. While the contributor is described as receiving "extra" depreciation deductions 
under the remedial method as compared to the traditional method, the contributor, by entering 
into the partnership, gives up substantial depreciation deductions to the noncontributor, and it 
is difficult to imagine that the contribution would be made "with a view" to reducing the 
contributor's tax liability when her depreciation deductions are significantly reduced. 
59. See Joel Scharfstein, An Analysis of the Section 704(c) Regulations, 48 Tax 
Law. 71, 89 (1994). 
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It therefore becomes necessary to examine the cost recovery rules that create 
the abuses in the examples. 
In both examples, one year remains in the property's recovery period 
at the time of contribution, but economic life is substantially longer. The 
consequences of this discrepancy are, in example 2, that a sale in year two 
generates substantial tax gain with little if any economic gain and, in example 
3, that the property generates substantial income after its tax basis has been 
reduced to zero. 
At first blush, it appears appropriate for the partnership to depreciate 
the property over its economic life; indeed, if it did so, the perceived abuses 
would disappear in both cases. To illustrate, consider the results if the 
partnership in example 3 depreciates its book basis of $10,000 and its tax 
basis of $1,000 on a straight line basis over the property's economic life of 
10 years. In each year, it would have $1,000 of book depreciation, divided 
equally between the two partners, and $100 of tax depreciation which, under 
the traditional method, would be entirely allocated to K, the noncontributing 
partner. If the agreement contained a curative allocation of sales income to 
J equal to the ceiling-limited depreciation (of $400 per year), the capital 
accounts at the end of the first year would be as follows: 
J K 
Tax Book Tax Book 
Initial Balance $1,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
Depreciation 0 (500) (100) (500) 
Sales Income 4AOO 4,000 3,600 4,000 
$5,400 $13,500 $13,500 $13,500 
The result is that the ceiling rule distortion ($400 annually) is contemporane-
ously eliminated by the curative allocation, but unlike example 3 in the 
regulations, K effectively deducts its investment in the property over the 
useful life of the property, rather than all in the first year. There is clearly 
nothing abusive in this result. It approximates the solution proposed in the 
regulations, but it goes one better, for in this example no book/tax disparity 
is ever created for K. 
Similarly, in example 2, if the partnership's book and tax depreciation 
were spread over the property's economic life, the first year's book and tax 
depreciation would be $1,000 and $100, respectively. Under the traditional 
method, the book depreciation would be divided equally between C and D, 
and the tax depreciation would be allocated entirely to C, the noncontributing 
partner. The planned sale in year two would result in book gain of $1,000 
and tax gain of $9,100, of which $8,100 represents built-in gain that must be 
allocated to C. The book gain of $1,000 is allocated equally between C and 
D, as is the last $1,000 of tax gain. The effect on the capital accounts would 
























In this variation, instead of shifting $4,000 of C's precontribution gain to D, 
the parties have shifted only $400, a result unlikely to be considered abusive. 
The culprit leading to the abuses in the examples thus appears not to 
be any feature of section 704( c ), but the depreciation methods used for book 
and tax purposes. The next obvious question, then, is why the Treasury chose 
the section 704( c) regulations as the forum for eliminating these abuses. 
Although the method of depreciation described above seems quite 
reasonable, it is not permitted by the Code or the regulations. Under Code 
section 168(i)(7), the partnership is "treated as the transferor for purposes of 
computing the depreciation deduction ... with respect to so much of the 
basis in the hands of the transferee as does not exceed the adjusted basis in 
the hands of the transferor." Thus, in the examples, where the contributing 
partner had $1,000 of basis in the property and one year left in its recovery 
period, the partnership's tax deduction for the first year must be $1,000, and 
cannot be computed over the useful life of the property. 
This rule does not, however, dictate how the partnership should 
compute its book depreciation. Even if tax depreciation must be taken all in 
one year, the partnership could nevertheless use the useful life of the property 
as the measuring rod for book depreciation. Were this the case, the first 
year's tax depreciation in example 3 would be $1,000, and the first year's 
book depreciation would also be $1,000. Under the traditional method, both 
book and tax would be divided equally because this would provide D, the 
noncontributor, with tax depreciation equal to its share of book depreciation. 
On the sale for $10,000 in the second year, there is $9,000 of built-in gain, 
which can be entirely allocated to C under the traditional method. The 
remaining $1,000 of tax gain which matches the $1,000 of book gain would 
be divided equally. The effect on the capital accounts would be as follows: 
C D 
Tax Book Tax Book 
Initial Balance $ 1,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
Depreciation (500) (500) (500) (500) 
Sale 9,500 500 500 500 
$10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
Thus, it appears possible to live with the rule of section 168(i)(7) and 
still avoid shifting of gain and losses; in this variation, the ceiling rule never 
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comes into play. But consider the situation where the property is retained for 
its economic life. If book depreciation is based on the economic life of the 
property, tax depreciation in year one is again $1,000, and is again divided 
equally. In years two through ten, however, the ceiling rule applies, and even 
though K is entitled to $500 of book depreciation each year, there is no tax 
depreciation at all in those years. As a result, the capital accounts after the 10 
years are as follows: 
C D 
Tax Book Tax Book 
Initial Balance $1,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
Depreciation {500} {5,000} {500} {5,000} 
$ 500 $ 5,000 $ 9,500 $ 5,000 
The result is an even greater tax/book disparity in D's capital accounts than 
occurs under the method utilized by the regulations. This is caused by the 
fact that tax depreciation in the first year exceeds D's share of book 
depreciation, so that some of it is allocated to the contributing partner. Thus, 
not only is the noncontributor deprived by the ceiling rule of sufficient tax 
depreciation to match its book depreciation, but some of the noncontributor' s 
share is deducted by the contributing partner! 
The rules for calculating book depreciation are found in section 
1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(g)(3) of the regulations. When that regulation was first 
issued in 1985, it permitted just the result described above: Book depreciation 
could be computed under any reasonable method, so long as, if the book 
value was greater than tax basis, book depreciation was not less than tax 
depreciation. The rules worked well so long as tax depreciation did not 
exceed the noncontributing partners' share of book depreciation. But when it 
did, as in the above example, the invariable result was the shifting of 
depreciation to the contributing partner, a sort of inverse ceiling rule problem. 
In an attempt to plug that particular hole in the revenue dike, the 
Treasury revised the regulation to require that book depreciation be computed 
at the same rate as tax depreciation. It is because of this rule that the 
partnership in example 2 must, for book purposes, depreciate the property 
completely in the first year, even though its economic life is significantly 
longer. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
So long as the ceiling rule is with us, policy considerations favor a 
narrow construction of the section 704(c) anti-abuse rule. If the rule is 
interpreted so broadly as to potentially apply to every transaction in which 
appreciated or depreciated property is contributed to a partnership, all such 
transactions will have to be tested against the regulations' stated purpose of 
section 704(c): preventing shifting of tax consequences among partners with 
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respect to precontribution gain or loss.60 Whenever the traditional method 
is used and the tax attributes of the contributed property are ceiling limited, 
the transaction would fail that standard, and the applicability of the anti-abuse 
rule would turn on the factually difficult issues of whether the requisite 
"view" was present and whether the resulting reduction in tax liability is 
"substantial." I do not believe that this would be in the best interest of the tax 
administration. 
Transfers of assets of ongoing business enterprises are essential parts 
of many partnership formation transactions. If one accepts the Treasury's 
recent statement of the intent of subchapter K-to "permit taxpayers to 
conduct joint business (including investment) activities through a flexible 
economic arrangement without incurring an entity level tax"61-allowing a 
free flow of property into and out of partnerships is an essential element. One 
of the most potent arguments in defense of the ceiling rule is that forcing 
contributing partners to include notional income items under some variation 
of a deferred sale method would violate the nonrecognition rule of section 
721. Moreover, given the frequency and importance of contribution transac-
tions, the certainty of a rule-based structure is a substantial benefit in this 
context. 
Much has been written outside of the tax field on the choice between 
drafting laws as detailed rules or as broad standards.62 The difference 
between the two approaches has been described as the difference between ex 
ante and ex post decision making: When a law is drafted as a rule, it is 
known in advance whether particular transactions or acts fall within or 
without the law. Laws setting out only broad standards create less certainty. 
It is up to some decision maker-usually, a court or administrative body-to 
determine whether a transaction or act satisfies the standard. Given the 
frequency with which property is contributed to partnerships, the costs of 
determining whether a transaction accomplishes or violates the purposes of 
section 704( c) could, if imposed on every contribution transaction, have the 
effect of discouraging partnership formations.63 The costs of enforcing such 
60. See generally Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. Chi . L. Rev. 871, 893-98 
(1991) . 
61. Reg. § l.701-2(a). 
62. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 126-31 (1961); Ronald M. Dworkin, 
The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L.R. 14 (1967); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L.R. 1685 (1976); Frederick Schauer, Playing by the 
Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decisionrnaking in Law and in Life ( 1991 ). 
63. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke 
L.J . 557, 621 (1992), in which Professor Kaplow concludes, "The central factor influencing 
the desirability of rules and standards is the frequency with which a law will govern 
conduct . .. When behavior subject to the relevant law is frequent, standards tend to be more 
costly and result in behavior that conforms less well to underlying norms." 
1996] Use and Abuse of Section 704(c) 125 
a standard, in contrast to a clear and understandable rule, would be great as 
well. 
Limiting the reach of the anti-abuse rule as proposed in this article 
would not leave the Service helpless in the face of abusive transactions. So 
long as the ceiling rule exists, shifts of income will occur under section 
704(c) in perfectly legitimate transactions, even though they might violate the 
stated purpose of section 704(c). The Service will have to live with these 
shifts. However, where ceiling rule shifts are accelerated by taxpayers 
exploiting the Treasury's own capital accounting rules, which ignore 
economic reality in calculating book depreciation, the anti-abuse rule may 
apply, as illustrated in the examples of the regulations. Where the ceiling rule 
does not apply, the traditional method successfully taxes the noncontributor 
under an aggregate approach, thereby leaving no room for abuse. 
Beyond these situations, except in those few cases where transactions 
are so contrived as to fall under the general partnership anti-abuse rule of 
section 1.701-2, the Service should permit certainty in planning contributions 
of property to partnerships.64 
The problem posed in this article is of the Treasury's own making. 
Had the Treasury abandoned the ceiling rule, the remedial allocation method 
could be required of all partnerships, and the section 704(c) regulations could 
be substantially simpler than they have turned out to be. Because of its nod 
to economic reality in computing book items, the remedial allocation method 
leaves little, if any, opportunity for creating shifts of income. Thus, I believe 
that abandonment of the ceiling rule would have been in the best interests of 
all. The Treasury's refusal to create safe harbors from the section 704(c) anti-
abuse rule, and its insistence that all contribution transactions are potentially 
subject to that rule-which derive from its adherence to the ceiling rule-are 
in no one's best interests. 
There may be room for in terrorem tax regulations. For example, the 
passive loss regulations issued under section 469 have successfully eliminated 
many abusive transactions. Some aspects of partnership taxation may deserve 
similar treatment. But, section 704(c) is too integral to the purpose and intent 
of subchapter K to be subject to such a rule. 
64. Section l.701-2(b) requires that the prov1s10ns of subchapter K and the 
regulations thereunder be applied in a manner "consistent with the intent of subchapter K" as 
enunciated in that regulation. This anti-abuse provision clearly has a broader reach than the 
§ 704(c) anti-abuse rule, which limits its focus to the purpose of § 704(c). Thus, even if an 
allocation method passes muster under the§ 704(c) anti-abuse rule, it is subject to attack under 
the broader rule if the contribution transaction as a whole contravenes the intent of subchapter 
K. To the extent that§ l.701-2(b) is a codification of judicial doctrines, it is appropriate that 
merely satisfying the narrow § 704(c) anti-abuse rule should not insulate a contribution 
transaction from attack if it lacks substance. 
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APPENDIX 
Example I. A and B form an equal partnership to which A contributes land 
with a basis of $60 and a fair market value of $100 and B contributes $100 
cash. The land was a capital asset in A's hands, and is also a capital asset in 

























Variation 1. The land in Example I increases in value, and AB sells 
it for $120, realizing book gain of $20 and tax gain of $60. 
Variation 2. The land in Example I goes down in value, and AB sells 
it for $70, realizing book loss of $30 and tax gain of $10. 
Example ll: C and D form an equal partnership to which C contributes 
equipment (basis of $80 and value of $120) and D contributes $120 cash. The 
equipment originally had a 10-year recovery period, and C elected to use the 
straight line method of cost recovery. Although only four years remain in the 
recovery period at the time of the contribution, the equipment would have 
had a 10-year recovery period if CD had purchased it on the date of 
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Variation 1: C's adjusted basis in the equipment at the time of 
contribution is $40, rather than $80. Thus, CD's initial adjusted basis 
in the equipment is also $40, and CD is permitted only $10 of annual 
depreciation for tax purposes. For each of its first four years, CD has 
$20 of ordinary business income before taking depreciation into 
account. 
